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This  study  assesses  the  impact  of  competition  on quality  and  price  in  the  English  care/nursing  homes
market.  Considering  the  key  institutional  features,  we  use  a theoretical  model  to  assess  the  conditions
under  which  further  competition  could  increase  or reduce  quality.  A dataset  comprising  the  population
of  10,000  care  homes  was  used.  We  constructed  distance/travel-time  weighted  competition  measures.
Instrumental  variable  estimations,  used  to account  for the  endogeneity  of  competition,  showed  quality
and  price  were  reduced  by greater  competition.  Further  analyses  suggested  that  the  negative  quality  effect
worked  through  the  effect  on  price  – higher  competition  reduces  revenue  which  pushes  down  quality.
© 2013  Elsevier  B.V.  All  rights  reserved.eywords:
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. Introduction
Market mechanisms and competition has been introduced into
he long-term care systems of many countries, replacing hitherto
ublic bureaucratic, non-proﬁt or other non-market arrangements
Fernandez et al., 2011). The importance of markets in the care
omes sector in England has increased markedly in the last 30
ears; by 2010 over 90% of all placements were made in the
are homes market, with only a residual number of (publicly-
upported) residents placed directly in publicly-owned homes
Laing & Buisson, 2010). This paper seeks to assess the impact
f market competitiveness on quality and prices. Whole-market
etrics of concentration indicate that the English care homes mar-
et is highly competitive (Forder and Allan, 2011).
Despite market forces playing a crucial role in the provision of
are homes in England, there is very little work that has examined
he impact of competition. Forder and Netten (2000) found a mean
rice elasticity of competition for English residential and nursing
ome placements of −0.04, while for providers in London authori-
ies the mean price elasticity was −0.08. Gage et al. (2009) found a
∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +44 1227823873.
E-mail addresses: j.e.forder@kent.ac.uk (J. Forder), s.allan@kent.ac.uk (S. Allan).
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ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jhealeco.2013.11.010ositive association between price charged and quality ratings, but
etten et al. (2003) found no relationship between the quality of
he home and the likelihood of closure, although (low) price was
een as an important contributory factor.
There is a larger US evidence base on the impact of competition
n nursing home price (Nyman, 1994; Mehta, 2006; Mukamel and
pector, 2002) and quality (Nyman, 1994; Zinn, 1994; Grabowski,
004; Starkey et al., 2005; Gammonley et al., 2009; Zinn et al.,
009). This literature suggests that price effects of competition
re small and the effects of competition on quality are mixed.1
tudies that looked at the relationship between quality and mar-
et concentration as measured (predominantly) by a county level
erﬁndahl index found that more competition led to reduced qual-
ty (e.g. Grabowski, 2004). One study (Castle et al., 2007) found
he opposite. By contrast most studies that look at indicators of
arket contestability – e.g. use of CON regulations and other indi-
ators of excess demand – suggest that the least contested markets
e.g. where excess demand can persist) produce lower quality.
he paucity of appropriate ‘quality’ measures, problems of mar-
et deﬁnition and little account of the potential endogeneity of
ompetition measures are limitations of some of the literature.
1 See Forder and Allan (2011).
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This paper examines the impact of competition in the English
are homes market. We  used the population of just over 10,000
are homes in England identiﬁed using data from the regulator,
he Care Quality Commission (CQC). Quality was measured by the
QC’s quality rating of the home. The four-category quality rating
f the home was determined after inspection visits, documen-
ary returns made by the care home and by other data. It covered
even key lines of regulatory assessment (KLORA) about the qual-
ty of: individual health and personal care needs support; daily
ife and social activities; stafﬁng (training and numbers); envi-
onment (safe, well-maintained and comfortable); resident home
hoice and information; management (openness, effectiveness and
uality assured); and complaints and protection.2 The ratings were
ublicly available and listed on many care home directory websites
n addition to the regulator’s website. This measure is a proxy for
n underlying quality or utility gain construct. A signiﬁcant posi-
ive relationship between quality ratings and the social care-related
uality of life (SCRQoL) of a sample of care home residents has been
ound (Netten et al., 2010).
We  calculated competitiveness/concentration for each home
irectly, avoiding the need to rely on administrative boundaries
o identify markets.3 Using homes’ address (postcode), competitors
ere identiﬁed, with the total number of competitor beds weighted
y distance (straight-line and travel time adjusted).
The behaviour of each provider is likely to affect the behaviour
f competitors, and therefore affect the level of competitiveness
ocally (Bresnahan, 1989; Forder, 2000). In principle, nonetheless,
he level of competition in any given locality will be strongly related
o underlying demand and supply characteristics, including the
actors affecting barriers to entry and exit. These characteristics
ill vary geographically and therefore the competition any one
rovider faces will be a function of these characteristics in its local-
ty and also the characteristics of neighbouring localities (as they
lso affect the circumstances of competitors). Summary statistics
f the latter can serve as instrumental variables to address the
ndogeneity problem.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses
he institutional characteristics of the care homes market. Section
 develops a conceptual model to link the empirical analysis to
he underlying economic theory. Section 4 discusses the empirical
peciﬁcation. Section 5 presents and discusses the data, and the
esults of the analysis follow in Section 6. The implications of the
ain ﬁndings are then discussed.
. Institutional characteristics of the care market
The care homes market has two main groups: (1) publicly-
upported residents where services are commissioned by public
uthorities (local councils) on behalf of service users; and (2) self-
ayers (those who do not qualify for public support). In 2010 40% of
lacements in private (for- and non-proﬁt) care homes in England
ere self-funded. Other than a small proportion of placements
ade by the National Health Service (around 8%), the remaining
lacements were made by commissioners in local councils.
By and large, the self-pay market can be regarded as a con-entional market, although all homes, regardless of payer, are
equired to meet minimum quality standards (assessed as outlined
bove) or face sanctions, including removal of operating licences.
2 http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20100812003411/http://cqc.org.
k/ db/ documents/klora care homes 200903181530.doc.
3 Local authority-funded residents can be placed outside of the funding council’s
dministrative boundary. In 2008, 26,220 (14.4%) supported over-65 residents were
laced ‘out of area’ (NHS Information Centre, 2008).
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he publicly-supported market is a quasi-market (Bartlett et al.,
994). There is a wealth-based means-test whereby people with
ligible assets (including housing assets for single person house-
olds) below a certain threshold receive council ﬁnancial support;
therwise they are self-payers (Wanless et al., 2006).
There are 152 councils in England that commission long-term
are services. Exact commissioning practice varies between them,
ut generally involves the following process. Commissioners nego-
iate with care homes that are prepared to offer services in line
ith the council payment rate for that locality and other conditions.
ocal authority-supported placements are then made according to
hese terms for individual placements. In some cases, councils may
lock purchase places in advance. The contractual terms require
hat the home meets the minimum quality standards, but they gen-
rally do not involve any considerations for higher quality beyond
hat level. There are no restrictions that the care home needs to be
ithin the council’s boundaries. On this basis, demand from coun-
ils is unlikely to be affected by quality choices made by homes
bove the minimum.
Local authority commissioners work with potential LA-funded
esidents to ﬁnd a place in their preferred care home. Potential resi-
ents are able to choose potential homes as long as the home meets
he council’s contractual terms. In this process, commissioners will
ocus on ﬁnding a vacancy in a care home that meets the minimum
tandards. We might expect potential residents to be inﬂuenced
y the quality of homes they wish to use, but also by other fac-
ors, particular the home’s location. Since a care home admission
s usually prompted by some health crisis (sometimes described as
 ‘distressed purchase’), the availability of a vacancy in any local
ome is often seen as an overriding priority.
Individuals are often required to make a contribution to the
ocal authority for their placement, but the amount of the charge
eﬂects the person’s means, not the characteristics of the place-
ent (Wanless et al., 2006). Some councils also allow supported
esidents to opt for higher priced homes if a third-party (not the
esident) can be found to pay the difference over the council price.4
his could also mean that demand is affected by quality although
he demand for higher quality would be tempered by the need for
 third-party to pay a top-up on the price.
Local authorities appear to have some market power as sug-
ested by the discounts they apparently secure compared to
elf-pay rates (Ofﬁce of Fair Trading, 2005). Similar price different-
als are seen between public (Medicaid) and private payers in the
S nursing home market (Grabowski, 2004; Mukamel and Spector,
002).
Self-payers have more freedom to choose homes at their pre-
erred price-location/type-quality point, but it is worth noting that
lmost all homes currently operate with a mix of self-pay and local
uthority residents (Laing & Buisson, 2010). As such, local authority
ommissioning practices are likely to inﬂuence self-payer purchas-
ng options.
The NHS also funds places in care homes, but without charges
or third-party top-ups) for residents. The process and terms are
imilar to LA-funded placements, although the prices that the NHS
ill pay are often slightly higher.
Much of the industry comprises single home providers or small
ulti-home organisations, although there are some large chains.
round 15% of the market is supplied by non-proﬁt providers. How-
ver, many ‘for-proﬁt’ providers, particularly the single home or
mall multi-home organisations can be regarded as having some
4 The extent of topping up is unclear but as many as one third of local-authority
unded placements could involve top-ups (Laing & Buisson, 2010).
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incur a loss on council-funded clients and this would have to be
offset by proﬁts on self-pay clients. If there were few self-payers
quality would be constrained to be near to the minimum. WithJ. Forder, S. Allan / Journal of H
on-proﬁt motivation (Matosevic et al., 2000; Knapp et al., 2001;
etten et al., 2001; Kendall et al., 2003).
. Theoretical considerations
The care homes market can be characterised as monopolistically
ompetitive with both horizontal and vertical differentiation. In
eneral in the literature, the effects of increased competition on
uality are ambiguous a priori in this case (Tirole, 1988; Gaynor and
own, 2011; Propper and Leckie, 2011). We  use a simple model –
ased in part on that of (Gaynor and Town, 2011, p. 52) – to consider
hether the key institutional features outlined above add further
nsight to the standard result.
Demand for care home services is inﬂuenced by the level of dis-
bility and ill-health in the population (i) and by the wealth of
otential service users (i) (Darton et al., 2010). The latter will have
 negative effect on council demand and a positive effect on self-pay
emand (due to the means-test on public support). Moreover, an
ncrease in the number of providers N in a local market will reduce
he demand faced by incumbent providers i; therefore: ∂xi
∂N
< 0.
Suppose that the proﬁts of care home i are:
i = pci xci (qi, di, pci , i, i) + psi xsi (qi, di, psi , i, i)
− ci(qi)(xci + xsi ) − F(qi) (1)
here pk
i
are prices and xk
i
demand from councils purchasers (k = c)
nd self-pay purchasers (k = s). Homes set one level of quality5 qi ≥
 at or above the minimum q enforced by the regulator, and operate
n one location di. Marginal costs ci generally rise with quality, as
o (sunk) ﬁxed costs F. For convenience, we assume that F(q) = 0,
nd Fq > 0 and Fqq > 0.
We assume that providers maximise utility, Zi:
i = i(qi) + mi(qi)xi (2)
hich includes proﬁts but also reﬂects non-proﬁt motivation in
orm of gaining utility from quality (mq > 0, mqq < 0) with m(q) = 0.
ote that xi = xci + xsi .
The dominant purchasing power of the council purchaser allows
 degree of price setting as regards pc
i
. In this case we  assume that
he council price is set through a collective bargaining process. Sup-
ose that this process results in prices set at: pc = ci(q) + (N) =
(N). Here (N) > 0 is a market power function with N ≤ 0 and
here prices fall slowly with N so that no provider experiences
 demand increase when new providers enter the market. We  also
ssume that the council price does not vary with quality above the
inimum i.e. q = 0.
Providers are left to choose self-pay price and quality (after the
ocation decision). The ﬁrst order condition with respect to quality
hoice is:
q = ixcq + (mi − ci)xcq + psi xsq + psqxsi + (mi − ci)xsqi
+ (mqi − cqi)xi − Fqi = 0 (3)
ith the equivalent for price. Solving the ﬁrst order condi-
ions together gives optimal quality and price in partial reduced
orm: q∗ = q∗(N , d ,  ,  ) and ps∗ = ps∗(N , d ,  ,  ). Council-i i i i i i i i i i i i
unded places will be priced at: pc∗
i
= (Ni, di, i, i).
Since council purchasers are not (much) interested in quality
bove the minimum in this model (i.e. assuming that xcq = 0, q >
5 We assume a single quality at the home level. It might be possible for homes to
ifferentiate quality in terms of amenities like room size between residents but our
eﬁnition of quality is more fundamentally covering many aspects of quality of life
f  residents.
t
b
a
l
D
p
f Economics 34 (2014) 73–83 75
, in the limit case), quality in markets with a high proportion of
ouncil-funding eligible people is likely to be lower than quality in
arkets with a high proportion of potential self-payers (who do
are about quality). The proportion of council eligible people will
e negatively correlated with wealth, and therefore we  expect that
q∗
i
/∂i > 0.
The impact of competitors Ni on quality is indeterminate in the
eneral case when we cannot sign ZqN6:
qN = ixcqN + Nxcq + psi xsqN + psNxsq + psqxsN + psqNxsi
+ (mi − ci)(xcqN + xsqN) + (mqi − cqi )(xcN + xsN) (4)
here N < 0 and xcN < 0. The sign of this function is indeterminate
ithout further assumptions.
With a range of payer types with differing preference for quality,
he market is likely to stratify by quality. The impact of competi-
ion is clearer when we  focus just on markets with predominantly
ouncil-supported payers i.e. those markets with low population
ealth L. Consider the limit case of homes that only secure
ouncil-supported residents (and where there are no third-party
op-ups involved). Suppose also that council-funded purchases are
ompletely unconcerned with quality above the minimum, such
hat xcq = 0 (and so xcqN = 0). Using the ﬁrst order condition (3) at
s(L) = 0, and substituting into (4), we have:
qN(xsi = 0) = Fqi
xcN + xsN
xc
+ [psNxsq + psqxsN]
+ (psi + mi − ci)
(
xsqN − xsqi
xcN + xsN
xc
)
(5)
The ﬁrst two  terms are likely to be negative, but the last is
ositive7: following an increase in competition, there is an incen-
ive to raise quality and thereby secure more ﬁnancially lucrative
elf-payers. But this effect is mitigated somewhat by the lower
elf-pay prices available after greater competition and the reduced
umber of residents over which to spread the extra ﬁxed costs
f quality. If the potential to attract self-payers is effectively zero
.g. xsq(
L) = 0, then (5) reduces to: ZqN(xsi = 0) = Fqi
xc
N
xc < 0. With
sual concavity assumptions, Zcqq < 0, the comparative statics in
his case are ∂qi/∂Ni = −ZcqN/Zcqq < 0 i.e. increased competition
educes quality. With extra competition, homes face lower demand
nd have less opportunity to spread the additional (ﬁxed) costs of
xtra quality. Providers choose quality above the minimum because
hey value quality – with q∗
i
set by
(
mqi − cqi
)
xi = Fqi . It is also pos-
ible that the break-even constraint will bind at quality levels below
∗
i
, however. Indeed, as competition increases and the council price
 tends to the marginal cost level, so quality is constrained down
owards the minimum. Even in local markets with some self-payer
emand, quality may  be constrained downwards by the effect of
dditional competition lowering  if the potential number of self-
ayers is limited: As N→ ∞,  any quality above the minimum would6 We have: ∂q/∂N = − (ZqNZpp − ZpNZqp)/(ZqqZpp − ZpqZqp), using Cramer’s rule over
he  implicit functions, i.e. Zp(q, p, N, d, ) = 0 and Zq(q, p, N, d, ) = 0.
7 As based on the model by Gaynor and Town, whereby demand for home i is given
y the product of market share si and total market demand Di , that is: xi = si(qi)D(qi)
nd xq = sDq + Dsq Here sq > 0 and we  would expect sqN > 0 (in that for a monopo-
ist  sq(N = 1) = 0, as s(N = 1) = 1 and in a more competitive market, sq(N > 1)>0. With
q → 0, this suggests that xqN = DsqN + sNDq > 0. As regards price, for a monopolist,
q(N = 1) = pq > 0 where Pq is the maximum increase in price that the market will pay
or  increased quality. For a competitive market, pq(N > 1) ≤ Pq so pqN ≤ 0.
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ecreasing average costs (with scale) providers in this case would
ot just focus on the self-pay market.
In practice we would expect: council-funded purchasers to be
omewhat concerned with quality; for there to be some sensitivity
f self-pay demand even at the low end of the market; and for
roviders to operate with a mix  of payers. Therefore, the effects of
ncreased competition will be generally ambiguous. Nonetheless
his limit case result does show that a negative effect is possible in
his model.
.1. Competition
In keeping with the literature on monopolistically competitive
arkets, we can assume that local markets tend to zero proﬁts in
rder to deﬁne the number of providers in the long-run. Suppose
hat care home i operates in local market g, which can be deﬁned
s including any purchasers and other providers within range of
ome i.8 The number of beds supplied to that market in the long
un, differentiating payer type, Bk, is determined where average
roﬁts of homes in the market are zero, and can be found by solving
he system:
V
g (g, g, dg, B
c
g, B
s
g, −g, −g, d−g, B
c
−g, B
s
−g) = F(g, g) (6)
here the −g subscript refers to any market other than g that inﬂu-
nces behaviour in g. The term on the left hand side is proﬁt with
espect to variable costs only. Total beds supplied is: Bg = Bcg + Bsg .
he level of competition in market g is then Ng = Ng (Bg).
Given home i’s quality and price, the level of competition faced
y home i will be directly correlated with Ng i.e.:
i = Ni(Ng(qi, pi), g, g, dg, −g, −g, d−g) (7)
Generally we would expect the number of competitors
o increase with need-related characteristics g, such that
Ni/∂g=i > 0. However, the effect of an increase in wealth g is more
ifﬁcult to anticipate, not least because the effect on beds supplied
o meet council-funded demand is likely to be opposite the effect
n beds for self-payers. We  cannot sign ∂Ni/∂g=i a priori.
.2. Hypotheses
We  have the following main empirical hypotheses:
1. In general the effect of competition on quality is ambiguous.
owever, there are circumstances where markets with predomi-
antly council funding could show a negative relationship between
uality and competition i.e. ∂qi∈C /∂Ni < 0 where C is the set of
arkets g where council funding dominates.
2. In council-funded only markets, the impact of competition on
uality works through price, and therefore ∂qi∈C/∂Ni(pi(Ni)) = 0
3. For the self-pay market, we cannot sign the differential qsN .
owever, we do expect that qcN /= qsN .
4. For the whole market we hypothesise that p∗N < 0. This is a
tandard result where prices are set by providers or follows from
ur deﬁnition of pc = (Nc, q) when prices are set by the public
uthorities.
. Empirical speciﬁcationWe  used a weighted Herﬁndahl–Hirschman index (HHI):
i =
∑Ni
j=1(wijBj)
2/
(∑Ni
j=1wijBj
)2
as a competition measure (with
8 In other words each ‘market’ is unique to provider i.
c
f
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t Economics 34 (2014) 73–83
eight wij). The HHI is inversely correlated with the number
f competitors Ni in a market and therefore the signs of our
bove hypotheses are reversed with respect to Hi. Note that, if
roviders all operated with the same output (beds), the HHI reduces
xactly to an inverse measure of the number of competitors: Hi =
(wiBi)
2
/(NwiBi)
2 = 1/N.
We sought to account for the horizontal differentiation of
roviders by weighting output for distance and/or for travel times:
dij =
∣∣di − dj∣∣ ∣∣0.5ti + 0.5tj∣∣ for all j, where t is the normalised pre-
icted travel time per kilometre for the local authority where care
ome j is located. We  used an inverse square-root weighting on
istance and travel time in the Herﬁndahl, i.e. wij = 1/d0.5ij . Fur-
hermore, a maximum range for competitors was implemented;
roviders located outside this range were assumed to have no com-
etitive effect (which therefore deﬁnes Ni). Ranges of 10 and 20 km
ere used with their travel time-weighted equivalents. Potentially,
he impact of competitors should also be weighted in terms of the
ertical differentiation of providers, but with a categorical qual-
ty classiﬁcation of providers in the data, the intuitive basis for
eighting in this case is less strong. Our strategy was  to proceed
ithout re-weighting for quality differences, although we  did use
xogenous shift factors for quality in the model.
Similarly, we might want to make allowance for different ‘types’
f provider e.g. primary client type, home type (nursing vs. resi-
ential), organisational afﬁliation, and also for location by council
dministrative area. We  proceeded in this case, by using intercept
ummies for type rather than modifying the competition weight.
deally we would weight the distance variables between each home
f the same type to be greater than between homes of differ-
nt types. We might have also weighted competition differently
f competitor beds were in a different local authority (especially
elevant for those near boundaries). Although there is no restric-
ion on local authorities funding placements in homes outside the
uthority area, it is possible that any differences in LA policy might
ork through as a competition effect. This effect would be modest
f neighbouring local authorities tend to adopt similar policies, as
necdotal experience suggests. The general problem was  that the
esultant matrix of weights for these effects would quickly become
omplicated arbitrary weights.
The partial reduced-form equations – the solutions to (3) – for
uality can be used in the estimation, substituting the HHI (Hi) for
i
∗
i = q∗i (Hi, i, i) + ε
q
i
(8)
We only observe home-average price, pi, not price by payer-
ype in the data and therefore we  combine the reduced-form price
quations above to give:
∗
i = p∗i (Hi, i, i) + ε
p
i
(9)
There is a potential to see spurious associations between
uality and our competition variable in the data. Suppose that
ompetition is greater for markets with mostly council-funded
emand compared to markets with mostly self-pay demand, such
hat ∂Hi/∂i > 0. Furthermore, as noted above, we anticipate that
q∗
i
/∂i > 0. Any omitted wealth-related factor in (8) or (9) may
hen result in an apparent positive relationship between HHI and
uality (i.e. ∂qi/∂Hi > 0) that was due to differences in payer compo-
ition rather than a competition effect. It is important therefore to
ontrol for exogenous factors, and in particular to include variables
or all wealth-related factors i in the empirical model.The dependence of Hi on (own) price and quality suggests that
here will be non-zero correlation between Hi and the error term εi
n (8) and (9). This endogeneity can be addressed using instrumen-
al variables where the predicted value of the competition measure
J. Forder, S. Allan / Journal of Health Economics 34 (2014) 73–83 77
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s used in (8) and (9). We  have Hi = Hi(Ng(qi, pi), g, g, dg, −g, −g,
−g) from (7) using the HHI in place of Ni, and therefore the terms
−g, −g, d−g can be potentially used as instruments, predicting Hi
ut not directly appearing in the structural Eqs. (8) and (9), given Hi.
e cannot observe these terms exactly but can instead substitute
sing a vector of demand and supply characteristics summarising
he local areas in which competitors operate – see data below.
The two step efﬁcient generalised methods of moments (GMM)
stimator was used to estimate Eqs. (8) and (9). A log of price was
sed in the estimation. Both a two step GMM  linear probability
odel (LPM) and an ordered probit model were used for the multi-
ategory quality variable. In the latter case, the predicted value of
HI from a ﬁrst stage estimation was used in the probit estima-
ion. The whole system was bootstrapped (1000 reps) to produce
tandard errors for the coefﬁcients.
We speciﬁcally consider hypothesis H2 using the following
tructural model for quality:
∗
i = q∗1i (Hi, pi(qi), i) + ε
q1
i
(10)
In view of the endogeneity of price, we substituted its predicted
alue into (10) using a ﬁrst-stage reduced-form estimation.
. DataPrice data comes from the Laing & Buisson Care Homes Con-
acts dataset which contains information on all care homes across
he United Kingdom in July 2010. The CQC dataset of registered
a
t
t England, by MSOA.
dult social care services at September 30, 2010, contained 10,470
egistered care homes for older people. Using postcode, number
f registered beds and telephone numbers we were able to match
8.4% of these care homes with the Laing & Buisson dataset giving
 dataset of 10,302 care homes in England.
Fig. 1 shows the average level of competition in England at the
edium-level Super Output Area (MSOA) level. The MSOA level of
ompetition is found by taking the average level of competition
HHI) from all the care homes that are located in each MSOA; in
his case we  used the travel time-weighted HHI at a 10 km range.
ll 10,302 care homes were located in 4588 (out of 6781) MSOAs.
he ﬁgures were scaled according to the ofﬁcial measurement of
ompetition where a market with a HHI of less than 0.1 is consid-
red competitive, over 0.1 is considered concentrated, and over 0.2
s considered highly concentrated (Competition Commission and
fﬁce of Fair Trading, 2010).
Distance weighting of the HHI shows markets to be more con-
entrated/less competitive than they would be with no distance
eighting – even so, we saw a high level of competition indicated.
ith a market size deﬁned by a radius of 10 km, 4,152 of the 4,588
SOAs (90.50%) have an average level of competition that would
e considered to be competitive by the OFT. If market size were
xtended to a 20 km radius then only 10 (0.22%) MSOAs have an
verage level of competition that is non-competitive according to
he OFT.
Regarding price data, only summary (average) home level statis-
ics are available, although there is a good degree of heterogeneity
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Table 1
Quality ratings and average care home prices.
Star rating n % Home-average price (£ per week)
Mean Median SD
0/1* 1217 13.8 £522 £475 £163
2*  5963 67.7 £526 £482 £157
3*  1631 18.5 £572 £521 £191
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2Residential (personal care) 5414 61.
Nursing  3397 38.
All  homes 8811 100.
etween homes on this measure.9 Quality is measured using the
QC’s four-level quality ratings (‘star ratings’) measure. Previous
tudies have shown a reasonable degree of inter-rater reliability
n this assessment (Darton et al., 2010). In view of the low num-
er of 0-star homes (1.7%), this category was combined with 1-star
omes.10 Table 1 reports price and quality descriptive information
or the sample, including the crude relationship between price and
uality.
To account for demand and cost-shift factors (i, i), a range
f home-level variables were used, including: primary client type
dementia or old age); home type (nursing home or residen-
ial home); organisational afﬁliation (multi-home organisations);
hether the home was purpose built and length of time in busi-
ess.
In addition, we matched in characteristics pertaining to the
eighbourhood of the home. Speciﬁcally, we used National Statis-
ics data collected using standard geographical classiﬁcation, called
uper output areas. There are just over 32,800 lower-layer super
utput areas or LSOAs in England. Matching to the address of
ach care home, we used averages for: total population, percent-
ge of older people in the population, percentage of population
ith a long-term limiting illness, percentage reporting their health
s fairly good, percentage of older population that received pen-
ion credit (a means-tested pension top-up), percentage living
lone, and ranking on the multi-deprivation scale. Furthermore,
o account for market composition two variables were included:
rst, average house price for the LSOA, calculated using transac-
ions data on house sales from the Land Registry; and second, a
asic estimate of the proportion of care home residents that are
elf-funded in each Local Authority.11 Descriptive statistics are in
able 2.
Care homes are located into 9 regions (London, East Midlands,
ast of England, South East, North East, North West, South West,
est Midlands and Yorkshire and the Humber).
The matched database had 9609 independent sector (non-
ublic) homes. Price data were missing for 483 of these homes
5.0%). Approximately 1% (n = 82) of prices in the data were very
ow, and so likely to have been in error/miscoded, being below
ny feasibly sustainable price. There were also 10 homes with
rices over £2000 per week; as these were likely to be specialist
roviders and therefore not in competition with other care homes
n their market area, they were also excluded. 329 of the care
9 The L&B prices directory contains minimum and maximum prices by room type
single and shared) and client-type (nursing or residential). As such, any third party
op-ups will be included in the price data but cannot be discerned. A blended (mean)
rice was constructed by taking the crude average of minimum and maximum price
or  the service (client and room) types available in the home. Information on the
umber of beds of each type for each home was  not available, only whether or not
he  service was provided.
10 Homes that are rated as having 0 stars would have to make improvements to
heir care home or else face further sanctions, which could include loss of registra-
ion  (closure). As such, it seems reasonable to join these two star ratings together.
11 See Forder and Allan (2013).
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£534 £488 £166
omes were not primarily aimed at either older people or people
ith dementia and a further 14 cases had missing home level data
e.g. registration year) or local house price data, giving 8691 cases
or the price analysis (9.6% missing). Quality ratings were miss-
ng for 208 of these homes giving 8483 for the quality analysis
11.7% missing).
.1. Instruments
The instruments in the model (i.e. −g and −g) concern the
haracteristics of markets beyond home i’s local market. For this
urpose we used indicators summarised at larger geographies,
peciﬁcally for middle-level super output areas (MSOA): MSOA-
verage house price, the MSOA-average multiple deprivation score
nd the percentage of long term ill in the MSOA-level population.
he LSOA-level versions of these indicators were included as exoge-
ous variables in the price and quality estimations; it was  assumed
hat any remaining impact from the MSOA level will only affect
ompetition.
The instruments used for the price estimation in (10) were:
SOA-average house price, the MSOA-average multiple depriva-
ion score and the percentage of long term ill in the MSOA-level
opulation. We  also added mean house prices within a 20 km radius
f each home as an additional instrument.
. Results
The results of the price estimations – the partial reduced form,
9) – are presented in Table 3. Table 4 has the quality estimation
esults i.e. of (8), including both the LPM and ordered probit model
OP) results. We used both a distance-weighted HHI (“HHIa”) and
he distance and travel time-adjusted version (“HHIb”).12
The models all satisﬁed under-identiﬁcation, weak-
dentiﬁcation and over-identiﬁcation tests13, except one price
peciﬁcation: the variant with 20 km travel time competition:
0 km-HHIb in Table 3.
The coefﬁcients on the home and LSOA level characteristics had
he expected signs in both the price and quality estimations. As for
egional effects, homes outside London were signiﬁcantly cheaper.
n average, homes in the Home Counties were next most expen-
ive, other things equal.
12 Travel time per kilometre is predicted using a general linear model regression of
ocal council level travel time data using MSOA level population density and average
ouse price as independent variables. The predicted values are then normalised by
he average predicted travel time per km of the care home sample.
13 For OP models a pseudo-Sargan test for over-identiﬁcation was used based
n the residuals calculated from the outcome-weighted predicted values from the
stimation.
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Table  2
Independent variables – descriptive statistics.
Variable N Mean SD Min  Max
Endogenous
Average price 8691 528.48 158.05 323.00 1900.00
Star  rating 8483 2.05 0.57 1.00 3.00
10  km - HHIa 8691 0.05 0.07 0.01 1.00
10  km - HHIb 8691 0.04 0.05 0.01 1.00
20  km - HHIa 8691 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.81
20  km - HHIb 8691 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.21
Exogenous
Care  home level
Voluntary 8691 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00
Primary  client: dementia 8691 0.14 0.35 0.00 1.00
Nursing home 8691 0.38 0.48 0.00 1.00
Years  since registration 8691 20.38 6.13 2.00 64.00
Purpose  built 8691 0.25 0.44 0.00 1.00
Care  homes in organisational group: 3–9 8691 0.16 0.37 0.00 1.00
Care  homes in organisational group: 10–19 8691 0.07 0.26 0.00 1.00
Care  homes in organisational group: 20–49 8691 0.06 0.23 0.00 1.00
Care  homes in organisational group: 50+ 8691 0.16 0.37 0.00 1.00
LSOA  level
House price 8691 225,081.50 144,027.90 43,568.17 3,264,864.00
Proportion population over 60/65 8691 0.25 0.09 0.02 0.69
Total  population 8691 1,620.37 327.79 814.00 6,398.00
Index  of multiple dep. score rank 8691 16,933.30 8755.68 1.00 32,465.00
Long-term limiting illness 8691 0.21 0.06 0.06 0.48
Health  fairly good 8691 0.23 0.04 0.11 0.37
Over  60/65s pension credit uptake 8691 0.24 0.14 0.01 0.94
Proportion self-funded residents in LA 8691 0.53 0.10 0.001 0.81
Additional instruments
House price MSOA 8691 201,892.60 100,534.70 48,904.00 1,374,322.00
Index  of multiple dep. score rank MSOA 8691 17,068.96 7775.36 64.00 32,244.60
Percent Long term ill MSOA 8691 19.33 4.56 6.07 35.77
Table 3
Price regression results.
Market Radius 10 km-HHIa 10 km-HHIb 20 km-HHIa 20 km-HHIb
Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E.
Competition
HHI 2.935*** 0.346 4.933*** 0.582 20.330*** 4.161 39.239*** 10.470
Care  home level
Dementia clients 0.041*** 0.009 0.044*** 0.009 0.040*** 0.016 0.047*** 0.016
Voluntary sector 0.033*** 0.010 0.026*** 0.010 0.024* 0.014 −0.014 0.023
Nursing home 0.150*** 0.027 0.157*** 0.030 0.164*** 0.059 0.187*** 0.085
Care  home group 3–9 0.034*** 0.008 0.036*** 0.008 0.042*** 0.014 0.035** 0.016
Care  home group 10–19 0.054*** 0.012 0.044*** 0.013 0.060*** 0.018 0.048** 0.022
Care  home group 20–49 0.047*** 0.015 0.040*** 0.015 0.093*** 0.019 0.076*** 0.025
Care  home group 50+ 0.104*** 0.009 0.089*** 0.010 0.107*** 0.015 0.083*** 0.019
Registration length (log) −0.086*** 0.011 −0.076*** 0.012 −0.074*** 0.018 −0.063*** 0.019
Log  registration length sq 4.5e−5*** 1.4e−5 4.7e−5*** 1.4e−5 3.4e−5* 1.8e−5 3.5e−5 2.2e−5
Purpose built 0.016** 0.008 0.022*** 0.008 0.038*** 0.012 0.043*** 0.016
LSOA  level
Percent older population −0.007*** 0.001 −0.007*** 0.001 −0.014*** 0.003 −0.012*** 0.004
Total  population sq −9.5e−9*** 2.7e−9 −1.0e−8*** 2.8e−9 −2.0e−8*** 5.5e−9 −2.2e−8*** 7.4e−9
Average house price (log) −1.166*** 0.218 −0.950*** 0.212 −2.435*** 0.457 −2.639*** 0.731
Log  avg house price sq 0.051*** 0.009 0.043*** 0.009 0.104*** 0.019 0.115*** 0.030
Deprivation rank (log) 0.049*** 0.009 0.028*** 0.007 0.095*** 0.019 0.062*** 0.020
Percent long term ill 0.016*** 0.002 0.016*** 0.002 0.028*** 0.005 0.023*** 0.007
Percent health fairly good −0.010*** 0.002 −0.010*** 0.002 −0.022*** 0.004 −0.019*** 0.006
Percent pension credit −0.628*** 0.108 −0.622*** 0.109 −0.809*** 0.201 −0.765*** 0.238
Percent pension credit sq 0.888*** 0.148 0.813*** 0.140 1.384*** 0.278 1.320*** 0.356
Proportion self-funded residents in LA (log) 0.007 0.005 0.007 0.006 −0.032** 0.015 −0.055** 0.025
Under-ident 116.805*** 121.013*** 60.978*** 37.803***
Weak ident (F-test) 44.99*** 44.98*** 9.51*** 5.35***
Weak ident (KP rk Wald F) 39.095a 41.536a 20.677b 13.020c
Over-ident 2.594NS 1.019NS 2.477NS 13.769***
Reset  (functional form) 0.05NS 0.98NS 0.38NS 2.04NS
n = 8691, all models include region dummies. Estimated using the ivreg2 command for Stata (Baum et al., 2010).
NS indicates not signiﬁcant. *, **, and *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% signiﬁcance, respectively.
a Exceeds 5% maximal IV bias and 10% maximal IV size.
b Exceeds 5% maximal IV bias and 15% maximal IV size.
c Exceeds 10% maximal IV bias and 15% maximal IV size (Stock and Yogo, 2005).
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Table 4
Quality regression results.
Market radius LPM 10 km-HHIa LPM 10 km-HHIb LPM 20 km-HHIa LPM 20 km-HHIb OP 10 km-HHIb OP 20 km-HHIb
Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E.
Competition
HHI 1.743*** 0.648 3.298*** 1.163 11.886** 4.674 31.025** 14.322 6.955*** 2.522 63.527** 32.274
Care  home level
Dementia clients −0.041** 0.018 −0.038** −0.019 −0.039* 0.020 −0.033 0.022 −0.084** 0.037 −0.077** 0.038
Voluntary sector 0.157*** 0.022 0.154*** 0.022 0.151*** 0.023 0.125*** 0.030 0.320*** 0.046 0.258*** 0.053
Nursing home −0.094 0.069 −0.090 0.070 −0.090 0.079 −0.071 0.106 −0.184 0.142 −0.138 0.142
Care  home group 3–9 −0.034* 0.018 −0.032* 0.018 −0.029 0.019 −0.031 0.021 −0.071* 0.036 −0.071** 0.036
Care  home group 10–19 −0.011 0.026 −0.017 0.027 −0.007 0.027 −0.016 0.030 −0.033 0.054 −0.031 0.054
Care  home group 20–49 −0.021 0.028 −0.027 0.029 0.008 0.029 0.002 0.033 −0.057 0.058 −0.002 0.057
Care  home group 50+ 0.006 0.020 −0.004 0.021 0.007 0.021 −0.011 0.026 −0.009 0.042 −0.024 0.045
Registration length (log) 0.043*** 0.016 0.051*** 0.016 0.048*** 0.017 0.058*** 0.020 0.106*** 0.033 0.119*** 0.034
Purpose built 0.045*** 0.017 0.049*** 0.017 0.059*** 0.018 0.068*** 0.022 0.104*** 0.035 0.141*** 0.039
LSOA  level
Percent older population 2.7e−4 0.002 1.4e−4 0.002 −0.005 0.004 −0.007 0.006 4.0e−4 0.005 −0.013 0.010
Total  population sq −3.3e−9 4.7e−9 −4.4e−9 4.9e−9 −1.1e−8 6.3e−9 −1.7e−8 1.1e−8 −9.6e−9 1.0e−8 −3.4e−8 1.8e−8
Average house price (log) 0.015 0.025 0.027 0.024 0.045* 0.026 0.101** 0.041 0.056 0.049 0.205*** 0.072
Deprivation rank 4.9e−7 1.8e−6 −1.3e−6 1.7e−6 4.3e−6 2.7e−6 2.3e−6 2.6e−6 −2.7e−6 3.4e−6 4.6e−6 4.4e−6
Percent long term ill 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.012* 0.008 0.015 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.029* 0.018
Percent health fairly good −0.006 0.004 −0.007* 0.004 −0.011** 0.006 −0.015* 0.008 −0.015* 0.009 −0.030** 0.014
Percent living alone (log) 0.047 0.035 0.029 0.034 0.036 0.036 −0.025 0.047 0.059 0.071 −0.053 0.084
Percent pension credit (log) −0.058* 0.030 −0.064** 0.030 −0.057* 0.032 −0.070* 0.038 −0.137** 0.063 −0.137** 0.065
Percent pension credit sq −0.012 0.118 −1.6e−4 0.118 0.148 0.148 0.331 0.231 0.012 0.248 0.677 0.417
Proportion SF residents (log) 0.017 0.018 0.016 0.018 −0.007 0.023 −0.036 0.036 0.034 0.038 −0.070 0.064
Under-ident 98.456*** 101.241*** 99.430*** 109.045***
Weak ident (F-test) 13.33*** 14.91*** 16.32*** 20.51*** 42.29*** 4.89***
Weak ident (KP rk Wald F) 32.686a 33.703a 33.168a 36.579a
Over-ident 2.214NS 1.210NS 1.405NS 2.236NS 1.164NS 3.218NS
Reset (functional form) 0.48NS 0.51NS 0.22NS 0.14NS
n = 8483, all models include region dummies. LPM models estimated using the ivreg2 command for Stata (Baum et al., 2010).
NS indicates not signiﬁcant. *, **, and *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% signiﬁcance, respectively.
a Exceeds 5% maximal IV bias and 10% maximal IV size (Stock and Yogo, 2005).
Table 5
Price regression results – elasticities.
Competition measure HHIa – 10 km HHIb – 10 km HHIa – 20 km HHIb – 20 km
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results are in the ﬁrst part of Table 6, with both 10 km and 20 km
travel-time speciﬁcations of competition. In these estimations,
competition was insigniﬁcant, a result which is consistent with ourMean 0.156 
Median 0.084 
.1. Competition
Competition decreased prices in care homes, using either the
istance- or travel time-weighted HHI - elasticity ﬁgures are in
able 5. For our preferred measure, 10 km travel time-adjusted HHI,
he price elasticity of concentration was 0.22 at the mean level
f competition i.e. a 10% increase in competitiveness would cor-
espond to a 2.2% decrease in prices, a reduction of around £12
er week. Elasticity was slightly lower for the distance-weighted
easure (0.16). Using the 20 km market deﬁnition, elasticity levels
ere greater. This result is consistent with hypothesis H4.
As regards hypothesis H1, we found that quality was  positively
elated to concentration i.e. negatively related to competitiveness.
his result held (at high signiﬁcance levels) for both the LPM and
rdered probit models, and for all of the concentration measures
 see Table 4. The ordered probit allowed us to explore the effects
f competition on the probabilities of homes having particular star
atings. In other words, we could look at whether competition was
ore likely to affect the chances of homes having high quality (3*)
s opposed to low (0/1*) or moderate (2*). Fig. 2 shows elasticity
stimates using the 10 km HHIb measure; this result does not sug-
est that competition effects are focused on homes in particular
arts of the quality distribution. With a 10% increase in concentra-
ion, we would see fewer 0/1* homes and more 3* homes – some F 0.347 0.561
 0.209 0.397
/1* homes would become 2* (or 3* homes) and a similar propor-
ion of 2* homes as those moving up from 0/1* would become 3*
omes.
As regard hypothesis H2, using the estimation of (10), theig. 2. Percentage change in probability of outcome given a 10% increase in HHI.
J. Forder, S. Allan / Journal of Health Economics 34 (2014) 73–83 81
Table  6
Quality regression – price interaction results (ordered probit models).
Market Radius Price control Interaction
10 km 20 km 10 km 20 km
Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E.
Competition
Predicted HHI 3.509 3.861 −0.267 2.886 47.679** 21.248 115.325** 57.176
Predicted price (log) 0.314 0.859 1.038** 0.479 0.683 0.866 1.276*** 0.484
Pred  HHI*Pred price (log) −7.114** 3.347 −18.528** 9.150
Care  home level
Dementia clients −0.103* 0.053 −0.137*** 0.041 −0.108** 0.053 −0.138*** 0.041
Voluntary sector 0.312*** 0.052 0.292*** 0.048 0.309*** 0.052 0.293*** 0.048
Nursing  home −0.228 0.195 −0.342** 0.163 −0.236 0.195 −0.337** 0.163
Care  home group 3–9 −0.085* 0.048 −0.113*** 0.039 −0.087* 0.048 −0.112*** 0.039
Care  home group 10–19 −0.042 0.068 −0.075 0.060 −0.044 0.068 −0.074 0.060
Care  home group 20–49 −0.059 0.069 −0.088 0.066 −0.059 0.069 −0.086 0.066
Care  home group 50+ −0.029 0.088 −0.093 0.065 −0.033 0.088 −0.090 0.065
Registration length (log) 0.119** 0.057 0.157*** 0.044 0.116** 0.057 0.152*** 0.044
Purpose  built 0.095** 0.039 0.077** 0.036 0.093** 0.039 0.078** 0.036
LSOA  level
Percent older population 0.006 0.005 0.010*** 0.003 0.006 0.005 0.009*** 0.003
Average  house price (log) 0.023 0.101 −0.053 0.076 0.014 0.101 −0.056 0.076
Deprivation rank −2.4e−6 3.4e−6 −1.5e−6 3.3e−6 −2.6e−6 3.4e−6 −1.3e−6 3.3e−6
Percent long term ill (log) −0.028 0.240 −0.227** 0.115 −0.039 0.240 −0.222* 0.115
Percent  health fairly good −0.008 0.011 0.001 0.007 −0.007 0.011 0.001 0.007
Percent  living alone 0.126 0.200 0.022 0.170 0.116 0.201 0.023 0.170
Percent  pension credit (log) −0.092 0.084 −0.031 0.054 −0.091 0.084 −0.036 0.054
Proportion SF residents (log) 0.033 0.038 0.032 0.038 0.037 0.038 0.032 0.038
Weak  ident (F-test): HHI 36.13*** 23.84*** 36.13*** 23.84***
Weak  ident (F-test): Price 52.56*** 52.56*** 52.56*** 52.56***
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7Over-ident 1.903NS 1.803NS
S indicates not signiﬁcant. *, **, and *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% signiﬁcance, respec
ypothesis. To further explore this result we added an interaction
erm, multiplying the (predicted values) of competition and price.
he aim was to assess whether the marginal effects of competition
n quality differed according to the price band in which the home
perates. We  did not have a direct measure of the proportion of
lients in each care home that were publicly-funded as opposed
o self-funded. The price bracket in which the home operates is a
air indicator of this, however; most homes that have the major-
ty of their places publicly-funded will be in the lower part of the
rice distribution.14 Where this is the case, the theoretical model
uggests that the lower-priced homes market will show stronger
egative effects of competition on quality than the higher-priced
omes market. Hence the sign of the interaction term of concen-
ration (HHI) and price would be negative. The results, given in the
econd part of Table 6, provided some support for hypotheses H3,
ith a signiﬁcant negatively signed coefﬁcient on the interaction
erm.
.2. Payer-composition
The data did not allow direct observation of payer-composition
n the locality of each home, raising the possibility of omitted vari-
ble endogeneity bias on the competition measure. We  tackled this
otential issue in three ways. First, we included a range of wealth
actors in the empirical model that have been shown to be good
redictors of payer-composition (Darton et al., 2010) e.g. house
rices and rates of pension credit. Also, we ran IV RESET tests, which
ive some indication of omitted variable problems, but they were
ot signiﬁcant in any model. Second, ex post payer-composition
14 We would assume that publicly-funded placements that have a third party top-
p are more likely to be in the higher part of the price distribution.
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p2.172NS 1.945NS
.
proportion of self-funded places) was available at local authority
evel and was  included (although noting potential ecological fal-
acy issues at this level of aggregation). Third, we tried alternative
nstrumentation of HHI (Hi) in the model, speciﬁcally using pri-
arily need-related excluded instruments: using the proportion
eporting ill-health at the MSOA level rather than house price at
he MSOA level. The alternative models did not qualitatively change
he results.
.3. Other factors
The results showed (Table 4) that the voluntary sector was  asso-
iated with signiﬁcantly greater levels of quality (and price) than
he private sector. This ﬁnding is in line with the large, predom-
nantly US, literature in this area (Comondore et al., 2009). Care
omes that were primarily aimed at dementia clients had signif-
cantly lower levels of quality than their counterparts. The time a
are home had been registered and care homes that were purpose
uilt were both positively associated with higher quality. There was
 price premium associated with a placement in any care home that
as part of an ownership group of 3 or more care homes, but no
ifference in quality.
. Discussion
The extensive use of markets and private providers – often with
 high degree of public funding – are characteristics of the nursing
ome industry in many countries, not least in England. And yet
here is a relatively small literature investigating whether markets
n long-term care ‘work’, and whether promoting competition is
 beneﬁcial policy. What research exists tends to paint a mixed
icture.
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This analysis found a negative effect of competition on quality.
e argue that competition can have a negative effect on quality if it
ushes prices in the market down to the level where providers can
nly sustain the costs of minimum quality. Although providers are
ssumed to want to produce higher quality, other things equal, this
reak-even constraint can bind in competitive markets. This result
nly occurs if commissioners/buyers are predominantly interested
n cost rather than quality (or at least any quality improvement
bove the minimum standard). The empirical analysis offers some
upport for these hypotheses. In particular, a negative effect of com-
etition on quality was not found when price was  included in the
uality estimation. There was also some indication that the higher
rice end of the market is more responsive to quality – higher prices
re generally paid by self-payers (or publicly-funded placements
ith third party top-ups) rather than public commissioners.
The policy implications of this analysis on nursing home mar-
ets in England depend largely on judgements as to whether
inimum quality standards are acceptable. If competition is
ushing prices down such that providers are producing services at
inimum quality, but this quality is acceptable to policy makers,
hen greater competition can be seen as beneﬁcial. Such an inter-
retation can only be sustained, however, if we are conﬁdent that
he (non-market) actions of the regulator are sufﬁcient to maintain
inimum quality levels. Without robust regulation, and without a
hange in public commissioning behaviour, quality could deterio-
ate below acceptable levels.
We have sought to tackle some of the empirical challenges
dentiﬁed in the literature, namely, ﬁnding appropriate ‘quality’
easures, measuring competition and addressing potential endo-
eneity. Nonetheless, limitations need to be recognised in these
egards. We  rely on regulatory information on quality which is
ikely to be a noisy and potentially arbitrary proxy of the ﬁnal util-
ty gain from being in a care home. We  also make a number of
implifying assumptions about the impact of competitors on each
ome. Furthermore, although we use instrumental variables meth-
ds to address simultaneity issues, these are notoriously sensitive
o instrument speciﬁcation.
As well as simultaneity, there were also potential endo-
eneity problems due to omitted variables, notably missing
ayer-composition variables at LSOA level. There is a potential issue
ith the competition variable embodying the effect of differences
n payer composition on quality rather than competition effects.
e addressed this problem by (a) using a range of wealth factors
hat have been shown to be good predictors of payer-composition
b) using payer-composition data that was available at aggregated
evel (local authority) and (c) using alternative instruments for
redicting HHI. In all cases, the result of a negative impact of com-
etition on quality remained.
In addition there were a number of limitations in the data; in
articular, only having home-level average prices, not individual
esident prices, and having the usual missing values. We  did, how-
ver, perform a number of robustness checks in this regard: ﬁrst,
e included the price outliers; second, we used maximum or min-
mum prices in place of mean price; third, we separated out care
omes rated as poor (0 stars) and adequate (1 star); fourth, we
reated all poor rated care homes (0 stars) as missing; and ﬁfth, we
andomly assigned a quality rating to the additional care homes
hat were missing quality ratings but had price information.15 Our
ndings were not signiﬁcantly altered in any of these scenarios.
15 We assumed various distributions of star ratings for the additional care homes:
hat they had a larger proportion of poor/adequate care homes (doubled to 26%),
hat they had a larger proportion of care homes rated as excellent (doubled to 38%),
r that they followed the distribution of star ratings found in the data.
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There are a number of avenues which future work could take
n this area. A relevant limitation to address with further work
s in not accounting for the heterogeneous nature of care homes
n directly mediating competition effects. In particular we  could
xamine organisational effects more thoroughly by accounting for
are homes being run by the same group in the measure of compe-
ition, or examine competition assuming differentiation of markets
or nursing homes and residential homes and/or care homes pre-
ominantly for older people and for those with dementia. In further
ork we  will explore weighting our competition measure for these
ifferences in care home type. The intercept effects with regard to
ome factors – e.g. dementia homes – could also reﬂect different
pplicability or implementation of quality assessment by the reg-
lator, or perhaps insufﬁcient case-mix adjustment for dementia
omes.
This analysis uses cross-sectional data – it should be possible
o add further waves in order to explore the dynamic properties
f the market (although the policy backdrop is changing and this
imits continuity) and to help with omitted variables (e.g. payer-
omposition) limitations. The analysis would also beneﬁt from ﬁner
rained price data (for example, differentiating by payer type), but
his is not currently available from administrative sources.
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